A Historiography of Violence and the Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku Imam Bondjol and the Uses of History

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This essay is a revisionist history of the Padri War and the place of Tuanku Imam Bondjol in the intellectual history of the Minangkabau people of West Sumatra, of the Dutch colonial state, and of Indonesian nationalism. The Tuanku Imam is an official “national hero” from the early nineteenth century, a putative Wahhabi, and leader of the Padri War, the first Muslim-against-Muslim jihad in Southeast Asia. The essay examines the Tuanku Imam in contemporary sources and then his construction as a serviceable trope of controlled Islam, Minangkabau patriotism, or Indonesian nationalism by successive states. Using memoirs by the Tuanku Imam and his son, Sutan Caniago, the essay analyzes the Tuanku’s renunciation of Wahhabism in the face of matrifocal opposition and the interplay of three connected texts that serve to secularize the story of the Padri War.

On November 6, 2001, the Indonesian National Bank issued a note featuring a portrait of Tuanku Imam Bondjol. The image is striking: a man with a stern face and long beard, wearing a turban, with a white robe thrown back over his left shoulder (see figure 1). “Tuanku Imam Bondjol” was a formal title given to this man, named Muhammad Sahab and as a young adult called Peto Syarif, who was born in the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra around 1772 and died outside the city of Manado in North Sulawesi in 1854. “Tuanku” was a title given to high-ranking ulama in West Sumatra who were recognized authorities in the Islamic sciences of tauhid, fikh, and tasauuf. “Imam” signifies that he was a religious leader, although this second name would usually refer to some individual characteristic of the alim. Of the (at least) fifty Tuanku who were contemporaries of Tuanku Imam Bondjol, we find Bachelor Tuanku, Little Tuanku, Fat Tuanku, Black Tuanku, Old Tuanku, and so forth (Sjafnir 1988). “Bondjol” is
the old spelling of the town of Bonjol, where the Tuanku Imam established his fortress and from 1833 to 1837 led the fight against Dutch annexation of the Minangkabau highlands. In this paper, I follow Indonesian convention and use the old spelling of Bondjol for the man and Bonjol for the village.

The Tuanku Imam is in Indonesia an official national hero from the early nineteenth century, a putative Wahhabi, and leader of the Padri War, which is often described as the first Muslim-against-Muslim jihad in Southeast Asia. Since 2002 scholars have consistently traced the lineage of Southeast Asian Islamic violence back to this war and to the Tuanku Imam. Michael Laffan points to the Padri movement as a “most striking” example of what he cautiously terms Islamic “activism,” although he is doubtful that the movement can be considered strictly Wahhabi (Laffan 2003, 399–400). Other scholars are less sober in their deployment of the Padris. In September 2004, Merle Ricklefs gave a public lecture on Islam and politics in Indonesia that opened with a reference to the two-hundredth anniversary of the Padri War as the bicentenary of violent and bloody Islamic reformism in Indonesia. And in 2005, Azyumardi Azra, head of the State Islamic University in Jakarta, gave a series of public lectures on Islamic militancy in which he stated,

One should not be misled, however, with these current developments; in fact, radicalism among Indonesian Muslims in particular is not new. Even though Southeast Asian Islam in general has been viewed as moderate and peaceful Islam, but the history of Islam in the region shows that radicalism among Muslims, as will be discussed shortly, has existed for at least two centuries, when the Wahabi-like Padri movement, in West Sumatra in late 18th and early 19th [centuries] held sway to force other Muslims in the area to subscribe to their literal understanding of Islam. The violent movement aimed at spreading the pure and pristine Islam as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (the salaf). The Padri, however, failed to gain support from majority of Muslims; and, as a result, the Padri movement was the only precedent of Muslim radicalism throughout Southeast Asia. (Azra 2005b)

The sensitive post–September 11 Islamist could be forgiven for noticing the banknote, listening to the remarks of these Indonesianist historians, and wondering whether the Indonesian state had picked up some slag in the crucible of terror. The portrait of Tuanku Imam Bondjol is jarring to observers accustomed to the shadow of puppets and the tintinnabulation of gong orchestras, echoing

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3On the war as jihad, see Azyumardi Azra (2004, 146–47). In the Malay world, a jihad was more often referred to as a “holy war,” a Perang Sabili‘llah (Kratz and Amir 2002, transliteration 18, 20). The name “Padri” has been the cause of much speculation. It is most likely that “Padri” was a modification of the word “Padre” and referred (usually) disdainfully to priestly zealots of all faiths (Kathirithamby-Wells 1986, 3–9).
little more than modern thug gangs such as Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam.

But for Indonesians, and most historians of Indonesia, the appearance of Tuanku Imam Bondjol on the 5000 rupiah bill was neither alarming nor surprising. In the Netherlands in 1928, Mohammad Hatta delivered his Dutch-language polemic “Free Indonesia.” In his speech, Hatta berates the Dutch colonial state for forcing its subjects to learn the heroic legends of William Tell, Giuseppe Mazzini, Giuseppe Garibaldi, William of Orange, and others while disparaging the actions of Indonesians who had opposed European conquest: “So too must Indonesian youth parrot its masters and call its own heroes, like Dipo Negoro, Toeankoe Imam, Tengkoe Oemar and many others, rebels, insurgents, scoundrels, and so on” (1928, 11). Following Hatta, since 1945 Sukarno had referred to Tuanku Imam Bondjol as the first of a triad of heroic comrades (pahlawan tiga-sekawan) who had fought against Dutch colonial expansion: the Tuanku Imam Bondjol of Minangkabau in West Sumatra, Diponegoro from Central Java, and Teuku Oemar of Aceh (Soekarno 1950; see also Reid 1979). “Imam Bonjol” is now a common street name in Indonesian towns. The West Sumatran campus of the State Islamic University is named after Imam Bondjol. And in November 1973, Tuanku Imam Bondjol was formally declared a national hero, one of only a handful who lived before the concept of Indonesian nationalism was on the table (Schreiner 1997).

With the fall of Soeharto, historians of Indonesia have turned their attention to the place of official national heroes and the creation of a collective

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4 Interestingly, the 1972 translation uses the word “terrorists” for “scoundrels” (schurken)—impossible today (Hatta 1972, 210).
5 Sukarno’s immediate inspiration for his idea of the three heroes was perhaps not from Hatta but from a 1940 book by the Minangkabau writer Tamar Djaja (1946). Djaja’s first three heroes are Bondjol, Diponegoro, and Oemar, and the book features an introduction by Muhammad Yamin himself.
Indonesian memory. These studies have pivoted on moments of national violence and trauma—the massacres of 1965 and 1966, the riots of 1998 (Zurbuchen 2005; Roosa 2006). Less frequently, scholars have considered the role of national heroes in their provincial contexts (Barnard 1997; Schreiner 2002). Tuanku Imam Bondjol is particularly interesting. His story has been written by the inhabitants of a province far from the center (of the colony, of the nation). The Minangkabau region has often been at violent odds with that center, while the people there have seen themselves, paradoxically, as defining constituents of the central state (Kahin 1999).

I will briefly review the history of the Padri War and describe Minangkabau society. In addition to the footnoted sources, my understanding of the war is based first on the memoir of Tuanku Imam Bondjol himself. This manuscript, one of the most important sources for the study of nineteenth-century Indonesia, has itself had an eventful history. A translated gloss of this memoir, dated 1839, appeared initially as appendix B in the Dutch resident’s account of the war. In the 1910s, a full Minangkabau-language Arabic script version was circulating in West Sumatra and was described by Ph. van Ronkel in an article in the Indische Gids (1915). In 1939 L. Dt. R. Dihoeloe used the memoir and interviews with elders to publish the first Malay-language summary of the text. Dihoeloe’s version, uncited and often indirectly, became the source for most subsequent Indonesian accounts of Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s life. In 1979 the historian Sjafnir Aboe Nain recuperated and transliterated the original full memoir, using it in his Intellectual History of Islam in Minangkabau, 1784–1832. Sjafnir’s transliteration of the text of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol, then considered a component of the tambo (traditional history) of Naali Sutan Caniago, the Tuanku’s son, had been available only as a 280-page photocopy of a degraded typescript (Caniago 1979a). Only in 2004 was the transliteration formally

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6. “Memorie van Toewankoe Imam aangaande de komst der Hollanders in Sumatra’s binnenlanden en den aldaar door hen gevoerden oorlog” (Memories of Tuanku Imam Concerning the Arrival of the Dutchmen in the Interior of Sumatra and the War That They Conducted There), dated September 13, 1839, Ambon (Stuers 1850, 221–40). This has been translated into English (Dobbin 1972).

7. The manuscript was borrowed from Ali Usman, the Tuanku’s descendant and guardian of the family heirlooms in the village of Bonjol, in May 1966 for study and exhibition at the new Adityawarman Museum in Padang. It was never returned. The manuscript apparently changed hands numerous times, appearing at the opening of the Imam Bonjol Museum in the late 1970s, exhibitions in Jakarta and Padang, and making a final appearance at the first Istiqlal Festival in Jakarta in 1991 (interview with Ali Usman Datnak Burnak, July 2006; see also Haluan 1983). After this final exhibition, the Naskah was allegedly returned to West Sumatra and has not been seen since. Rusydi Ramli, a professor at the State Institute of Islamic Studies in Padang, who was a member of the Istiqlal planning committee, photocopied the manuscript, and I was able to obtain from him a degraded copy of what is possibly the last remaining example of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol, now deposited in the library at the University of California, Berkeley. Efforts to locate the original manuscript are recounted in Suryadi (2006).
published by the Center for the Study of Islam and Minangkabau in Padang (Imam Bonjol 2004).8

The other major Minangkabau source for the history of the Padri War is the autobiographical note penned by the moderate alim Syekh Jalaluddin, written at the request the colonial administration in the late 1820s (Djilâl-Eddîn and De Hollander 1857; Kratz and Amir 2002). Jalaluddin was persecuted by the Padri, and his text provides a history of Islamic reform in the late eighteenth century as well as a critique of the Padri from within the reformist movement. Along with this “clarification” by Syekh Jalaluddin, Imam Bondjol’s memoir stands as what might be the first modern Malay autobiography.9 It is a text that exhibits a clear sense of personal interiority and an emotional resonance that comes perhaps from being written simultaneously for a Dutch contemporary audience and for Minangkabau posterity, from the perspective of a villager, not a courtier, and a Muslim reformist concerned especially with family structure and everyday life.

The scores of essays and books written by Dutch colonial administrators and soldiers provide an additional source of information about the war. These have been synthesized in Christine Dobbin’s monograph, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784–1847 (1983). Dobbin’s research is impeccable, and the book has been praised as the most thorough study of a jihad (Keddie 1994, 472). My gloss of Minangkabau culture is drawn from my own study of the historical interactions of Islam, matrifocal customs, and colonialism (Hadler 2008).

This essay will address the following points:

1. Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s particular position in the war generated an extensive archive in which he plays a central role and in which other leading ulama appear less significant.

2. This archive and historiography have been linked to state efforts to control West Sumatra and to limit the potency of a reformist Islamic call for warfare in the Dutch colonial, Guided Democracy, and New Order periods. However, this does not lead us to a facile reading of oppression and the stifling of Muslim militancy. Rather, state fear of Islamic rebellion recapitulated a common desire for peace and conciliation. The Padri War was deeply unpopular.

3. Nevertheless, the figure of Tuanku Imam Bondjol remained a potent trope of resistance and local autonomy for the Minangkabau people.

8The typescript, which differs slightly from the 2004 publication, can be found at the Adityawarman Museum in Padang and the Imam Bonjol Museum in Bonjol. I have checked the 2004 transliteration against the photocopy of the original Arabic-script manuscript. Page numbers refer to the manuscript; this pagination is also reproduced in the margins of the published transliteration.

9Ulrich Kratz (1992) argues that Jalaluddin’s memoir is idiomatically novel in his introduction to the transliterated text and in his essay.
Toward the end of his military career, Tuanku Imam Bondjol distanced himself from Wahhabism and internecine violence, turning a civil war into a war against Dutch aggression. The Tuanku Imam’s life can be read as a protonationalist rejection of religious divisiveness for the sake of anticolonial unity. From the 1930s through 1998 (with a break from 1950 to 1957), Indonesia experienced a series of repressive regimes that censored political discourse and effectively controlled the production of history. Tuanku Imam Bondjol appears in the 1930s as a key novelized historical figure in Sumatran popular fiction. The fictionalization of history circumvented censorship but also stifled rigorous historiographical debate until the 1960s, when the publication of the eccentric *Tuanku Rao: Hambali Islamic Terror in the Batak Lands (1816–1833)* forced a reconsideration of the Padri War and Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s violence.

**Review**

Concentrated in West Sumatra, the Minangkabau are one of the best known of Indonesia’s ethnic groups and famous as the world’s largest matrilineal Muslim society. Peggy Sanday (2002) makes a compelling argument for following Minangkabau practice—elites use the Dutch word *matriarchaat*—and claims that in its gender egalitarianism, the society is a true matriarchy. Certainly the seeming contradiction of Islam and matriliny has shaped the past two hundred years of Minangkabau history. The society has struggled with a conflict: Islamic inheritance, child custody, and residence laws are patrilocal and patrilineal, yet the Minangkabau are affiliated with large clan houses that are passed down from one generation of women to the next, defined by a common female ancestor.

Minangkabau people living in West Sumatra have a maternal longhouse that they call home. The house is ideally divided into three zones: a lower area nearest the door that serves as a public space for receiving guests; a middle platform for meals that is also a sleeping area for children, unmarried girls, and women who are no longer sexually active; and in the back, a series of small private chambers reserved for the clan women who still receive their husbands. When a girl is married, she is assigned the newlywed’s chamber, the largest room farthest from the door. All other women are ratcheted down, moving to new chambers. If the chambers are all in use, then the most senior woman, pushed to the end of the row, must decide whether she still needs the privacy of a bedchamber. If she is still sexually active, then an addition will be built onto the house. Otherwise, she will join the old women and children on the floor at night. When they reach puberty, boys are removed from the longhouse and spend their nights in the *surau*, a village prayer and boarding house. When boys reach adulthood, they take part in the tradition of out-migration, *merantau*, and leave the village.
to seek their fortunes in the expanded world, the *rantau*. Only when he has attained some social value through commerce or education will a young man be welcomed back to the village as a potential groom for the daughter of another house. Many of these Minangkabau do not return from their migrations, instead settling in towns throughout Indonesia. Across Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, and Sulawesi, villages and polities trace their conversion to Islam and even their foundation to the appearance of Minangkabau travelers. And despite their matrilineal social structure, the Minangkabau are universally recognized as one of the more pious of Indonesia’s ethnic groups (though the standards for measurement of piety, and its applicability to units of society beyond the individual, are difficult to establish).

An early sixteenth-century account reported that at least one Minangkabau king had recently converted to Islam (Pires 1990, 164), and a Portuguese mestizo who visited the highlands in 1684 reported hajjis at the royal court (Dias 1995). Minangkabau only experienced the organized and institutional drive to convert to Islam in the seventeenth century, when a central Sufi *tarekat* (mystical association) was established on the coast at Ulakan (Amrullah 1929; Suryadi 2001, 2004). Azra claims that the “embers of reformism” (2004, 145) were first stoked in the late 1600s, when members of the Ulakan student network observed with disappointment the overexuberance of their fellows commemorating the death of the founder of the *tarekat*. In the eighteenth century, American and European demand for coffee, pepper, and cassia created a boom in the highland economy that disrupted traditional trading systems and brought new intellectual influences through the port of Tiku, near Ulakan. Marginal villages with poor soil became wealthy by planting the new cash crops, threatening the influence of the traditionalist wet rice farmers. Many of the Muslim reformists came from these newly rich villages (Dobbin 1977). By the late eighteenth century, Islamic reformism had followed the Naksyabandiyah, Syattariyah, and Qadiriyyah *tarekat* into the highlands, and the Islamic school headed by Tuanku nan Tuo became a center for the reformist movement.

Syekh Jalaluddin remembered his father’s stories of the antebellum 1780s and the religious changes already under way in Minangkabau (Kratz and Amir 2002). Jalaluddin described the religious conditions in Minangkabau in the late eighteenth century, when his father was an Islamic reformist and educator. Already in the 1780s, centralizing religious schools were spreading throughout the highlands. The reformists moved from the old Sufi-influenced school at Ulakan, near the coastal town of Pariaman, traveling through Kamang and Rao in the highlands, stopping briefly in Koto Gadang, and finally settling in Batu Tebal, where eventually they garnered enough support to maintain the forty-man congregation necessary for Friday prayers. It would be a mistake to imagine that religious education in pre-Padri, precolonial Minangkabau was entirely localized and focused on village prayer houses. Religious scholars advertised experiences and connections in the religious centers of Mecca, Medina,
even Aceh—the world of Islamic learning was inherently cosmopolitan. Reformists were beginning to make inroads into the heartland. And important tarekat centers, with particularly potent teachers, had long attracted supplicants.

An attentiveness to private life and daily behavior was a common and novel discourse in the Islamic world in the late eighteenth century (Metcalf 1982). Through the early 1700s, Islam and the ulama had been primarily concerned with states and with kingship. These new reformist Islamic movements were more involved with the everyday lives of ordinary people; fatwa addressed issues of family life, sex, and appropriate conduct. From West Africa through South Asia and into the Malay world, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries brought local Muslim reformist and revivalist movements that shared common objectives and similar violent rhetoric (Hardy 1972, 53; Jones 1994, 18–20; Ahmed 1996, 39; Vikør 1999).

But while the Padris had many contemporaries, they were more profoundly opposed to local custom; Minangkabau matrilineal inheritance and matrilocality were affronts to shariah law that were impossible to ignore. There were consequences to this new discourse on private life. In Indonesia an attentiveness to the family and to daily life in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries presaged what in the early twentieth century became known as the modern. In the nineteenth century, a public sphere for Islam developed around concerns that the colonial state did not share (although the Dutch and, to a lesser extent, the British did attempt to control the private lives of their subjects). Muslims were kept out of politics—in the Dutch East Indies, hajji were barred from serving in the colonial civil administration—but they were “political” regarding social issues. From Mecca at the end of the nineteenth century, the Minangkabau Shiekh Ahmad Khatib railed against matrilineal inheritance in his homeland (Huda 2003). His students and readers became the core of the early twentieth-century reformist movement. When in the 1910s the colonial state tried to introduce nominal participatory politics to the natives, they expected a long tutelary process. For the ulama, no learning curve was needed for civil behavior, and to the horror of the government, they plunged into the political sphere fully fledged.

Caught up in the wave of eighteenth-century Islamic reformism, Tuanku nan Tuo, a moderate reformist around whom the future Padri coalesced, pushed for a stricter application of Islamic law, better attendance at Friday prayers, an end to gambling and drinking, and a cessation of the brigandry and slaving that came with increased trade. That trade also brought new wealth, and more people had the means to undertake the hajj pilgrimage. The Hijaz and Mecca were tumultuous in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From the final decade of the eighteenth century, the Wahhabs were involved in a campaign of conquest there, temporarily occupying Mecca in 1803 and capturing the city from 1806 to 1812. Wahhabi adherents reject textual interpretation as innovation and demand adherence to a way of life that follows the Qur’an and the
authoritative Hadith. In the Hijaz, the Wahhabi burned books, demolished domes, destroyed tombs and pilgrimage sites, and, according to one unimpressed scholar, engaged in a “campaign of killing and plunder all across Arabia” (Algar 2002, 20).

Sometime after the 1803 Wahhabi occupation, three Minangkabau hajji returned from Mecca, where, according to every written history, they had been influenced by the teachings of the conquering army. Coincidence is not proof, however, and in no Padri War–era Minangkabau text do we find mention of Wahhabism. However, Indonesian nationalists have focused on Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s apparent renunciation of this Wahhabism and embracing of a vision of Minangkabau society that included the traditional elite. Other authors have claimed that he was never so puritanical, pointing to notebooks preserved by the people of Bonjol containing the Tuanku’s writings on soothsaying (Dawis and Marzoeki 1951, 65–75). A text captured at the Bonjol fort and now housed in the manuscript reading room of the Leiden University Library depicts illustrations of the household of the prophet and holy sites in Mecca.10 This is not Wahhabi-approved reading material. In Indonesia today, Imam Bondjol is equated with deep religious faith, protonationalist and anticolonial resistance, and even Minangkabau patriotism. Popular opinion echoes scholars such as E. B. Kielstra (1887) and B. Schrieke (1920), who asserted that Tuanku Imam Bondjol, and in fact the Padri movement in general, should not be considered Wahhabi. The Padris permitted pilgrimages to gravesites, did not attempt to impose a hierarchy on the traditionally decentralized Minangkabau polity, and allowed Muslims to honor the birth of the Prophet Muhammad through the celebration of mawlid (on this final point, Schrieke refers to Jalaluddin, who was certainly not a Padri; see Dobbin 1972, 9; Steenbrink 1984, 35–36).

However, every contemporary Dutch and English commentator, and every participant in the war, did not hesitate to indicate that the movement was rooted in the teachings of Abdul Wahab. In an 1820 letter to William Marsden, Thomas Raffles claimed that the Padris “seem to resemble the Wahbees of the desert. They have proved themselves most unrelenting and tyrannical; but their rule seems calculated to reform and improve, inasmuch as it introduces something like authority, so much wanted all over Sumatra” (1835, 84). P. J. Veth, in his introduction to the canonical account of the war, makes the Wahhabi connection (Stuers 1849, xcix), and in the first Malay-language history of Sumatra, written with an anti-Padri bias, the influence of Abdul Wahab is stated as fact (Moeda 1903, 55). By 1939 one of the Tuanku’s hagiographers would, without hesitation, call the Padri movement “Wahaby” (Dihoeloe

10I thank Michael Laffan for bringing this text, Cod. Or. 1751, to my attention. Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s book of realizations (attahqiq), which explains his understanding of the separation of soul and body, is supposedly in the possession of the family of the late Haji Chalidi in Lima Koto, Pasaman (Sjafnir 1988, 134 n. 18).
1939, 29–30). The label “Wahhabi” was initially deployed as an insult, suggesting that reformist ideology was irreconcilably foreign in a Malay context. Today, Padri Wahhabism is a matter of pride for radicalized Indonesian reformist Muslims. It is impossible to know with any certainty whether the three hajji were directly influenced by Wahhabism while in Mecca (Roff 1987, 37–39). What is clear is that for these returning hajji, traditional Minangkabau culture was unacceptable; matriliney and matrilocal longhouses could not be reconciled with the essential teachings of Islam. One of the hajji, known as Haji Miskin, allied with more impatient reformists in Tuanku nan Tuo’s circle who established walled villages, grew beards, wore robes and turbans, and attempted to recreate an Arabian culture in highland West Sumatra.11 It is this combination of localized reformism and Wahhabi-like influence that became known as the Padri movement. In a violent affront to Minangkabau matrifocality, the extremist Padri, Tuanku nan Renceh, murdered his maternal aunt (Steijn Parvé 1854, 271–72). The Padri declared a jihad against the traditional matrilineal elite, burning longhouses (rumah gadang) and killing traditional leaders who upheld custom (adat) in the face of religious commandments. This Padri War was a protracted series of conflicts, and the Padri “state,” influenced by the decentralized and democratic traditions of Minangkabau polities, lacked a clear administrative hierarchy. The decentralization of authority allowed for a natural sort of guerilla warfare that did not encourage climactic or pyrrhic battles. In 1815 the Padris, using a ruse of peace talks, slaughtered the royal house of Pagaruuyung near Batusangkar (H. 1838, 130). They turned against the moderate reformists Tuanku nan Tuo and Syekh Jalaluddin, calling the men Rahib Tuo (old Christian monk) and Rajo Kafir (king of infidels) (Kratz and Amir 2002, 41).

For twenty years, sporadic fighting between reformist and traditionalist forces destabilized West Sumatra. Eager to rehabilitate the economy of the Netherlands in the aftermath of the Napoleonic War (moreover, after the secession of Belgium in 1830) and lured by rumors of gold and the power of the Minangkabau court, in 1821 the Dutch colonial government returned to the port of Padang, signed a treaty with the traditionalists, and sent an army into the hills. It is at this point that the extensive Dutch archive takes control of the historiography of the Padri War. According to this history, a series of treaties and perceived betrayals on all sides of the conflict punctuated twelve years of difficult fighting.

11Upon visiting the highlands in 1818, Thomas Raffles observed, “On entering the country, we were struck by the costume of the people, which is now anything but Malay, the whole being clad according to the custom of the Orang Putis, or Padris, that is to say, in white or blue, with turbans, and allowing their beards to grow; in conformity with the ordinances of Tuanku Pasaman, the religious reformer. Unaccustomed to wear turbans, and by nature deficient in beard, these poor people make but a sorry appearance in their new costume. The women, who are also clad in white or blue cloth, do not appear to the best advantage in this new costume; many of them conceal their heads under a kind of hood, through which an opening is made sufficient to expose their eyes and nose alone” (1830, 349–50).
But in 1830, the Dutch were able to reinvigorate their army with Dutch and Javanese troops fresh from victories over Diponegoro, and by 1832, the Dutch had defeated Bonjol and apparently incorporated West Sumatra into their burgeoning colony. However, the collapse of the Padri in 1833 was followed by a unification of the reformist Muslims and matrilineal traditionalists in a revitalized resistance to foreign occupation. Six more years of violent warfare ensued, and by 1838, the Minangkabau were defeated, their leaders killed or, like Tuanku Imam Bondjol, exiled. It was, according to the archive and the authoritative histories, the Dutch entry into the conflict on the side of the matrilineal adat traditionalists that prevented West Sumatra from becoming a permanent Wahhabi outpost. The memoir of Tuanku Imam Bondjol gives the lie to this narrative.

While the reformists were defeated militarily, their arguments for a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith remained compelling in West Sumatra. For two centuries, Minangkabau intellectuals have been obliged to defend the maintenance of matrilineal custom in the face of a rigorous critique from Islamic reformists. And despite regular predictions of the imminent demise of their Islamic "matriarchate," the Minangkabau people have managed to defend and strengthen their matrifocal tradition. The Padri War and reformist critique of Minangkabau custom forced the supporters of adat to articulate and defend the legitimacy of their beliefs. Paradoxically, it was neo-Wahhabism that preserved matriliney in Minangkabau; in Kerala in southern India and Negeri Sembilan in Malaysia, matrilineal custom collapsed under a more insidious attack from the colonial state and early twentieth-century purveyors of modernity (Peletz, 1988, 1998; Arunima 2003).

War (of Words)

The Minangkabau highlands to which the three "Wahhabi" hajji returned were not static. Coffee smallholding had generated considerable individual wealth, and local Islamic centers and tarekat were already in place, building a regional network of religious influence and friendships. An extensive system of footpaths connected highland villages to the west coast and to the rivers that flowed east to the Straits of Malacca (Asnan 2002). The rotational daily market shuttled between the various towns, its parameters marked out by the distance that a goods-laden water buffalo could shuffle in an evening. This market was an opportunity for news to be shared, for traditional stories to be told, and for connections to be made beyond the village. It was a proto-rantau—a chance for young men to leave home and accompany their mothers and fathers through a wider, though still circumscribed, world. This market system was one of the principal means by which a regionwide Minangkabau identity and language was maintained. And rampant dacoity—a chief concern of the Padris—would have disrupted these traditional circuits.
Accounts of Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s origins have claimed that his parents were Arabs or even Moroccans (Djaja 1946, 5). Depending on the writer, this narrative move might have improved the Tuanku’s Muslim credentials (especially as he was not a hajji) or diminished his Malay and protonationalist association (by explaining as Arabian the Padri propensity for violence and misogyny). In his own memoir and in contemporary Dutch accounts, there is no mention of foreign ancestors. He was a villager from the valley of Alahan Panjang in the northern reaches of the Minangkabau highlands. Alahan Panjang is a poor and arid region, and local boys were especially encouraged to out-migrate and seek their fortunes. The young Tuanku Imam Bondjol traveled the network of Islamic schools, studying with different teachers according to their specializations. He was, above all, a student of his own father, Khatib Bayanudin, and eventually joined his father's surau as a teacher with the title Peto Syarif.

As a young alim in the late 1790s, the Tuanku accompanied his patron, the traditional chief Datuk Bandaharo, to the reformist center led by Tuanku nan Tuo. The Tuanku and Datuk were part of the reformist movement there when the three hajji returned, and the Tuanku was deeply inspired by their Wahhabi-like teachings and fashions and their call for a return to shariah. He joined the Padri, but he was not considered to be one of the most violent and aggressive of them, a group known as the Harimau nan Salapan (Eight Tigers). From his memoir it is clear that Datuk Bandaharo was a confidante of the Tuanku and perhaps his leader. In the early 1800s, the two men set up a Padri fort in Alahan Panjang to wage their jihad. Anti-Padri forces conspired against them, and Datuk Bandaharo was poisoned and died. It was at this point that the Tuanku relocated his stronghold to the base of Mount Tajadi in the village of Bonjol, becoming the Tuanku Imam of Bonjol in 1807.

The Padri War, up through the Dutch intervention, was a bitter civil war. Tuanku Imam Bondjol looked to the Eight Tigers, and particularly Haji Miskin and Tuanku nan Renceh, following their example and making his fort the northern base of the jihad. From his memoir we know that Tuanku Imam Bondjol organized the burning of the village of Koto Gadang and instructed Tuanku Tambusai and Tuanku Rao to take the jihad farther north into the Batak lands. Bonjol, the fortress, became increasingly wealthy as Tuanku Imam Bondjol seized cattle, horses, mines, and slaves during his campaigns. At this point in the Tuanku’s career, the Dutch joined the fight and, in the central valleys, slowly began annexing Padri territory. Haji Miskin had been killed (Tuanku nan Renceh later dies of illness), and the locus of Padri authority shifted north to Bonjol. The forces of the Tuanku Imam had great success in converting the southern Batak to Islam and even reached the shores of Lake Toba. He was in contact with Muslim leaders in Aceh and stood poised to lead a revivalist movement spanning the entire

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12The best example of an early twentieth-century adat polemicist, still fighting against vestigial Padri, is Datuk Soetan Maharadja (1917).
northern half of Sumatra. While the Dutch appeared in the Minangkabau heartland and began to directly engage the forces of Bonjol, the Tuanku Imam was in a position of military strength. His cavalry and his knowledge of the highland plains and mountains were unmatched, and his troops had proven themselves capable of defeating Dutch forces (Kroef 1962, 151–53; Clarence-Smith 2004, 276). Control of rice fields and croplands, as well as gold mines, guaranteed his soldiers food and supplies. However, in his memoir the Tuanku is doubtful and needs to reaffirm the focus of his struggle. He contemplates for eight days and then calls his advisors to him for deliberation. “There are yet many laws of the Qur’an that we have overlooked. What do we think about this?” (Adapun hukum kitabullah banyaklah nan terlampau dek oleh kita. Itupun bagaimana pikiran kita?). His advisors affirm, “We have overlooked many of the laws of the Qur’an” (Banyak lagi nan terlampau hukum kitab oleh kita) (Imam Bonjol 2004, 39).

With his spoils, the Tuanku funds four of his followers, including Tuanku Tambusai and his matrilineal nephew, Fakih Muhammad, sending them on the hajj to acquire the “true law of Allah” (kitabullah nan adil/hukum Kitabullah sebenarnya) in Mecca (Imam Bonjol 2004, 39–40). The Tuanku continues to wage his war aggressively, burning enemy villages, killing the nobility, and building mosques. But the hajji return with unanticipated news: They report that in Mecca, the Wahhabi have fallen and the laws as studied by Haji Miskin are invalid. In the text of the Naskah, Tuanku Imam Bondjol now makes an extraordinary narrative shift.

Tuanku Imam Bondjol is chastened and repentant. He immediately returns the spoils of war and calls a great meeting of all the Tuanku and hakim (judges), basa and panghulu (customary rulers), declaring a truce and promising that he will no longer interfere in the work of the traditional authorities. While discord remains unsettled, the people agree to follow the law of adat basandi syarak—shariah as the basis for custom.

And they accepted the law of the Qur’an and they followed the Qur’an. So all the plunder and spoils were returned to their owners. And Friday, when everyone had arrived at the mosque, and they had yet to start their prayers then the Tuanku Imam, before all the judges, restored things to as they had been. “I speak to all the adat leaders and all the nobles in this state. And although more enemies may come from all directions rather than fighting them you adat leaders and I will live in mutual respect and peace and no longer will I meddle in the lives of the adat leaders in the state of Alahan Panjang. And so I restore all that is bad and good in this nagari” [village confederacy].

Dan terbawalah hanyolai hukum kitabullah dan terpakai kitabullah hanyolai. Jadi pulanglah segala harta rampasan dan kembali hanyolai kepada segala yang punya dan pada hari Jumat dan sekalian sudah tiba dalam mesjid, antara lagi belum lagi sembahyang maka beliau

“Now you speak this way to us, Tuanku, and so it is upon you that our hopes rest. You will replace our elders, and if oppressed or constrained we will complain but to you and you will be our protector.” This was the request of all the adat leaders to the Tuanku Imam. And so they applied the law according to the teachings of the Qur’an. And the adat leaders used the law of adat basandi syarik—shariah as the basis for custom. And if there was a problem with adat it would be brought to
the adat leaders. And if there was a problem with Islamic law it would be brought to the four Islamic authorities. And so word spread to every nagari and luhak from the nagari of Tuanku Rao and Tuanku Tambusai [the Mandailing front] to Agam and Tanah Datar, to 50 Koto and Lintau. And so it is that today every nagari uses this division of authority.


This is a complicated passage and one whose language deviates from the otherwise straightforward narrative of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol. The Tuanku was writing his memoirs while in exile in Ambon and Manado (see figure 2). He had in mind the twin audiences of the Dutch colonial state and Minangkabau posterity, knowing that the Dutch military would read the memoir and that his son would eventually return with it to West Sumatra. The meeting described here was a transformational moment in Minangkabau history. The Padri War as an Islamic reformist war was abandoned. The Tuanku surrendered in his struggle to purify Islam in Minangkabau and soon abandoned his house and mosque in Bonjol. The language, too, is ambiguous: He is simultaneously celebrated and derided by his former enemies.

In his memoir, the Tuanku Imam’s will to fight his fellow Minangkabau crumbles when he learns that Wahhabi teachings have been discredited. In an act of great moral bravery, the Tuanku publicly renounces his ideology, makes reparations, and apologizes for the suffering that his war has caused. In his memoir, Imam Bondjol’s enemies respond formulaically, looking to him as a patron. But there remains some ambiguity and even anger in their reported language. They demand that the Tuanku Imam replace their elders, people likely killed by the Padri in their war against traditional authority. And it is unclear whether the Tuanku Imam is to appoint replacements or to personally take the place of the people he is responsible for killing. In his wish for peace, the Tuanku uses the term dituahnya. This is a form of royal blessing usually delivered by the sorts of nobles whom the Padri had hoped to eliminate. The Tuanku Imam
restores the antebellum status quo, confining religious authority to matters of shariah and allowing customary leaders to adjudicate social issues. He proclaims that “adat basandi syarak”—shariah will be fundamental, even in questions of social custom. In fact, a Dutch administrator would report in 1837 the widespread acceptance of the formula, “Adat barsan di Sarak dan Sarak barsan di Adat,” which asserts that both Islamic law and local custom are mutually constituted and interdependent (Francis 1839, 113–14). Imam Bondjol claims a kind of victory in his accommodation with the traditionalists. Yet we know that he has dismantled the Padri as a Muslim revivalist movement and that he will soon withdraw, temporarily, from his role as leader.

The voice of the memoir is now exhausted; the Tuanku Imam wishes for peace with the “Company” (the common term for the Dutch colonial government long after the dissolution of the VOC), he is tired of living in a state where the leadership is divided (Imam Bonjol 2004, 43). Soon after the meeting with the local leaders, he gathers his family and leaves Bonjol for Alahan Panjang, turning the fort over to three customary chiefs. Within days these three panghulu agree to surrender Bonjol to the Dutch for a promise that the Dutch troops will not disturb the fort. However, the Dutch and Javanese soldiers soon evict the Minangkabau from Bonjol and occupy the fort, using the Tuanku’s house and even the mosque as a garrison. The Tuanku Imam learns of this and calls for a meeting with the Dutch commander Elout. In their conversation, the Tuanku Imam offers a truce, explaining that he is sixty years old and too tired to fight. Elout recommends retirement and appoints Tuanku Mudo, Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s protégé, as regent of Alahan Panjang. But the peace does not last. Both the Padris and the traditionalists are furious at the Dutch and Javanese abuse of the fort and mosque. After an incident of Dutch mistreatment of Minangkabau workers in which a man is shot, the Minangkabau (in the words of the memoir) run amuck, slaughtering the Javanese who were encamped in the mosque and 139 Europeans stationed in the town. On January 11, 1833, the war enters a new phase, that of the unified resistance of Minangkabau society to Dutch occupation.

Tuanku Imam Bondjol again becomes a military leader, and the memoir remains exceptionally detailed. He is often on the run, living in the woods, engaging in guerilla warfare with the Dutch. The Tuanku Imam is no longer a revolutionary, overturning a corrupt society and bringing religion to his countrymen. He is attempting to expel a foreign invader, and then he is trying to survive. The memoir describes a life shuttling from house to house, listing the names of mothers and children killed in the fighting, dreaming of peaceful days in Alahan Panjang. Tuanku Imam Bondjol is no longer a man blessed with the certainty of the zealot. His memoir becomes a text of doubt and trepidation. Tuanku Imam Bondjol is tired of living in the forest and fears for the welfare of his family. He becomes increasingly conciliatory, making speeches to traditional elites and assuring them of their essential place in Minangkabau society, meeting Dutch
officials and attempting to win guarantees of protection for his children. The fighting remains horrific, but slowly, the Dutch gain ground and retake Bonjol, defeating the Minangkabau rebellion in 1837. Resident Francis and other officials decide that the Tuanku Imam is too subversive a presence to allow him to remain in West Sumatra, as he has requested. He is exiled to Java, then to Ambon, and eventually to Manado, where, after a final five years of illness and pain, “at the end of his years, and out of luck” (Imam Bonjol 2004, 190), the Tuanku Imam dies.

The Tuanku Imam Bondjol had an epiphany of regret regarding Wahhabi-like teaching and then a second life that combined warfare with conciliatory discourse. But as the Dutch reports attest, his career was otherwise marked by extreme violence. In the 1820s, the moderate reformist Jalaluddin recounted his own experiences of the war for a Dutch audience. Jalaluddin complained that yes, the traditionalists of Agam were warlike, unable to differentiate halal from haram, and willing to sell their mothers and siblings for the right offer. But the Padri were worse.

There are good aspects of the Tuanku Padri, they organized prayers and enforced alms-giving and fasting during Ramadan, and undertook the hajj as they were able, and repaired mosques and bathing places, and wore permissible clothes, and commanded people to pursue knowledge, and commerce. And there are wicked aspects of the Tuanku Padri who committed arson, who [without customary authority] appointed officials in the villages, and murdered without cause, that is they murdered all the ulama [who disagreed with them], and murdered all the courageous people [who stood up to them], and murdered all the intellectuals, calling them traitors, and pillaged and looted, and took women who had husbands, and married women of unequal rank without their consent, and captured people and sold them into slavery, and made concubines of their captives, and insulted noble people, and insulted elders, and called the faithful infidels, and deprecated them.

Adapun yang baik sebalah Tuanku2 Pedari ialah mendirikan sembahyang dan mendatangkan zakat dan puasa pada bulan Ramadan, dan naik haji atas kuasa, dan berbaiki mesjid dan berbaiki labuh tepian, dan memakai rupa pakaian yang halal, dan menyuruhkan orang menun-tub ilmu, dan berniaga. Adapun sekalian yang jahat daripada Tuanku Paderi menyiar membakar, dan menyahkan orang dalam kampungnya, dan memunuh orang dangan tidak hak, yaitu memunuh segala ulama, dan memunuh orang yang berani2, dan memunuh orang yang cerdik cendaki, sebab ber’udlu atau khianat, dan merabut dan merampas, dan mengambil perempuan yang bersuami, dan menikahkan perempuan yang tidak sekupu dangan tidak relanya, dan menawan orang dan berjual dia, dan bepergundi tawanan, dan mehinakan orang yang
mulia2, dan mehinakan orang tuha, dan mengatakan kafir orang beriman, dan mencala dia. (Kratz and Amir 2002, 49)13

The reaction of the Europeans to this Padri violence would have far-reaching implications for Indonesianist scholarship. The British Sumatranist William Marsden was convinced that the Minangkabau kingdom was the cultural heart of the Malay world—a place where Sanskrit and Indic culture first touched down, civilization and ultimately redeeming the Malays as it had the Javanese. In an early influential essay, Marsden recommended an exploration of the Minangkabau kingdom, that the original Hindu-Malay transmission texts might be discovered, uncorrupted by Arabic (Marsden 1807, 218, 223). This idea that Minangkabau was the “ancestral home” of the Malay peoples shaped early Indonesianist philology, as it continues to shape Minangkabau self-perception today (Cust 1878, 133; Andaya 2000). The Padri War was therefore a threat to Pagaruyung, the ancient Minangkabau palace and the source of Malay culture (Drakard 1999). Minangkabau was granted a privileged position within the cultural strata of Indonesia. Marsden’s essay set up Minangkabau as the Indic contact point for the Malay world. The palace of Pagaruyung, the fabled kingdom in the Minangkabau highlands, would for the disciples of eighteenth-century Indology place the Malay people on the same cultural plane as their more overtly Hindu neighbors, the Javanese.

When Raffles made his famous expedition into the Padang highlands in 1818, Marsden’s hypothesis was tested. Raffles traveled inland from Padang, seeking out the legendary kingdom of “Pageruyung,” and found a ruin whose boundaries were marked only by fruit and coconut trees. In a feat of archaeological alchemy, Raffles conjured up the kingdom from rubble and scrub. The “once extensive city” had been thrice burned, and the ongoing Padri Wars had left the great Hindu-Malay stronghold abandoned and weed-clogged. In the village of Suruaso, Raffles and his entourage were escorted to the “best dwelling which the place now afforded—to the palace, a small planked house about thirty feet long, beautifully situated on the banks of the Golden River (Soongy Amas). Here we were introduced to the Tuan Gadis, or Virgin Queen, who administered the country.” These ruins (or fantasy of ruins) were proof of the great and noble history of the Malays, a civilization that once rivaled the Javanese and was now evidently “retrograde.” And when Raffles upends the stone stairway of a small mosque, revealing a “real Kawi” [old Sanskrit Javanese] inscription, we know what is to blame for the tragic degeneration: Islam. The necropolis of Pagaruyung, the shadowy “site of many an extensive building now no more,” is demarcated in scorched earth and a “few venerable trees.” Melancholic, quoting the Brata Yudha, Raffles could still see the palace in a stand of sugarcane, the throne etched in a large flat stone (Raffles 1830, 358–60).

13Kratz argues that the manuscript was produced before 1829, and therefore before 1833 and the shift from civil war to broad social resistance to the Dutch.
Raffles’s mission marked the beginning of an extensive and ongoing foreign penetration into the hills of West Sumatra. His sadness, his failure to find the Hindu-Javanesque kingdom that would legitimate Malay culture, would demonize Minangkabau Islam in the writings of many of the scholars who followed him into the highlands. And his overturned mosque-stoop, an uncovered and “real” proof of Hindu origins, can serve as a parable for the syncretic excavations thenceforth undertaken by Indonesianist anthropology.

ARCHIVE

We turn to the peculiar form of the text of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol. The text comprises three distinct sections. The first 190 pages are the memoir of Tuanku Imam Bondjol himself, from his youth to his death in Manado, brought back to West Sumatra by the Tuanku’s son, Sutan Saidi, who accompanied him into exile. Pages 191–324 are the memoir of another son, Naali Sutan Caniago, who fought alongside his father in the jungle and who was granted a position in the Dutch colonial administration as part of the terms of the Tuanku’s surrender. The third section, pages 325–332, contains the minutes (Proses Verbal) of a pair of meetings held in the Minangkabau highlands in 1865 and 1875. Many Malay manuscript collections contain multiple and unrelated texts bound into single volumes. They are not read intertextually. In the case of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol, it is precisely the connectedness of the texts that gives the story of the Tuanku such potency.

The Dutch scholar Ph. S. van Ronkel, who was given access to the manuscript in the 1910s, when it was in the possession of the Tuanku’s descendants in Lubuk Sikaping, read the third section as a distinct and separate text. In an article on “The Establishment of Our Penal Code on the West Coast of Sumatra According to Notations in a Malay Manuscript,” he noted that three different scribes had written the individual sections (1914, 251). Van Ronkel summarizes the third section of the Naskah, describing a major gathering of Dutch legal experts, leaders of the residency government, and all the principal Minangkabau officials working for the Dutch colonial state. He correctly views the meetings as a turning point in the incorporation of West Sumatra into the Netherlands East Indies. And in order to appreciate the significance of these meetings, we need to review the sorts of intrusions the Dutch colonial state imposed upon civil society in the Minangkabau region between the 1820s and 1875.

The year 1847 brought the cultuurstelsel, a system for the forced cultivation of coffee, to the highlands of western Sumatra. With this, the Dutch set up a mechanism for maintaining a native managerial corps, including the positions of kepala nagari and tuanku laras, which were first introduced in 1823 (Ambler 1988, 49–51). The Dutch understood that calling their regional administrators “Tuanku” would undermine the potency of the traditional and, until this
point, exclusively Islamic title of Tuanku. Initially, the *kepala nagari* was responsible for enforcing the collection and delivery of coffee, receiving a bonus for success or considerable jail time for failure (Colombijn 1998). By the 1860s, a newer position, the *panghulu suku rodi*, had been introduced to manage both coffee collection and the fulfillment of corvée duties (Abdullah 1967, 36–37). In 1875 hajjis were formally banned from work with the *Binnenlandsch Bestuur*—the colonial civil service—furthering the perception that the Dutch meant to foist an anti-Islamic elite on Minangkabau (Hasselt 1882, 61). This was the period when Minangkabau began sarcastically to call themselves “leaf-coffee Malays,” in reference to the scraps of harvested bushes from which they would brew a weak beverage (Zed 1983). It was for most a difficult time.

Elizabeth Graves cites a report from the late 1860s that discusses the abuse of corvée labor. Not only were people compelled to build coffee warehouses and government buildings, but also,

> Each larashoofd [Tuanku Laras] demanded his own residence and office in the territorial center for when he had to confer with Dutch officials. To make matters worse, local officials, both Dutch and Minangkabau, often misused the corvée levies, demanding in some cases extravagant architectural styles and decorations which increased the already onerous task. (1981, 68).

In 2001 the daughter of a Tuanku Laras recalled her father’s perquisites—four servants performing corvée duty and a horned-roof house, one of only thirteen that the Dutch permitted to be built in areas of new settlement (Aman 2001, 15, 60). These Dutch-made *panghulu, kepala*, and *tuanku* outlasted the cultivation system that had once given them purpose and justification. The corruption of the “false” *adat* elite led directly to the near uprising of 1897 and the Anti-Tax Rebellion in 1908 (Young 1994, 49–83). Yet they survived these challenges, and the trappings of their offices have until the present defined the guise of authority in Minangkabau.

Debt bondage and slavery were common throughout the Malay world, and every household could have its attendant slaves, people captured through raiding or indentured to the house. Then on January 1, 1860, the Dutch government formally abolished slavery in the Indies (Verkerk Pistorius 1871, 26–30, 106–11). Such declarations did not necessitate immediate implementation. It was only in 1875 that T. H. der Kinderen, the colonial law reformer, came to Minangkabau from Batavia, slaughtered a buffalo in each of the three principal districts (*luhak*), and proclaimed all the slaves to be free (Kinderen 1875, 1882; Sanggoeno di Radjo 1919, 93).

Immediately, elite Minangkabau society devised a means to recognize absolutely the class and status of a household. New kinship terms, such as *kamanakan dibawah lutuik* (sister’s children “below the knee”), were coined to designate the former slaves. The “free” families lived in longhouses at the center of the village,
in places reserved for the “original settlers.” Slave families were segregated, restricted to the margins of the village, and initially limited to particular styles of houses (Verkerk Pistorius 1871).

In 1872, Van Harencarspel, the self-described “chief secretary” (secretaris basar) of the colonial government, drafted regulations controlling movement and domestic behavior for all non-European residents of the colony (Toorn 1894). The laws set fines not only for unauthorized movement and residence but also for what was deemed to be inappropriate behavior within the longhouse. The fines were tiered according to the offense, and they provide a telling gauge of Dutch priorities.

The following offenses were, evidently, least offensive to the Dutch: “Wrongful movement” and “wrongful residence in a village” brought penalties of just one to fifteen rupiah. A woman faced the same fines if she slept with a man other than her husband or slept away from her house (roemah tangganja) for more than one night without permission. The appended notes clarify this: “An overstepping of these prohibitions occurs if a woman engages in various acts with a man, but does not technically commit adultery.” A man, too, could be fined for having illicit relations with a married woman. Trespassing and the unauthorized disposal of rotten goods also garnered fines of one to fifteen rupiah (Toorn 1894, 1–9, notes p. 30).

Greater fines—from sixteen to twenty-five rupiah—could be levied for intentional malice, the manufacture of firearms or gunpowder, or failure to guard one’s house. Failure to watch over children or the insane were likewise punished. The largest fines, twenty-six to sixty rupiah, were reserved for people who wrongfully called meetings, squatted on another’s property, or sold amulets (presumably promising invulnerability) (Toorn 1894, 15–24).

Most of these prohibitions were easily policed—wrongful residence, squatting, and arms manufacture were quickly investigated and confirmed. Other, more lustful crimes were far more difficult to prove and would have required the weighing of testimony and allegation. While Minangkabau would have tried to settle disputes without turning to the Dutch, irreconcilable differences left the colonial justice system as the arbitrator of last resort. The new legal system, of course, generated its complement of native lawyers, jaksa and jurusita, attorneys, and bailiffs. But average Minangkabau also set out to learn the new language of Western law. Books were published explaining the new regulations, many appending sample “official letters” and petitions (Kinderen 1882; Pamoentjak 1895; Blommenstein 1903). The Dutch attempt to turn Minangkabau into a litigious culture largely succeeded—although efforts to regulate marriage were resisted whenever possible.14 Land disputes tied up property for generations, intestate (Colombijn 1994). Under the Dutch, Minangkabau lived with colonial law and were watched by a native

14While the Civil Registry (Kantor Catatan Sipil) in Padang lists around fifteen native women marrying Europeans (soldiers mostly) every year of the colonial period, none of these women was explicitly noted as Minangkabau.
constabulary. Fines were enforced, and failure to pay meant time in prison. The colonial legal system was an intrusion that began during the Padri War but was accelerated and made procedural in the meetings described in the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol.

The minutes included in the Naskah describe a sequence of meetings in the central court in Bukittinggi, the first on April 6, 1865, and the second on December 14, 1875. Both meetings were chaired by Der Kinderen, who was evidently not prepared to invest in ritual buffalo slaughter without first being assured of a kind reception for his pronouncements. The meetings were attended by the governor of Sumatra's west coast, J. F. R. S. van den Bossche; the resident of the Padang highlands, H. A. Steijn Parvé; eleven Dutch controllers; seventy-six Tuanku Laras; and untold numbers of clan heads and panghulu. At the 1865 meeting, Der Kinderen advocated for the creation of a regional bureaucracy, with local Dutch officials supervising Minangkabau counterparts who would be in charge of carrying out the regulations. The law would be a combination of local customary adat and the Indies-wide hukum of the colonial government, echoing the balance between adat and shariah that was part of the Tuanku Imam’s legacy. A decade later, Der Kinderen reconvened the meeting and evaluated the successful implementation of a legal bureaucracy in West Sumatra. It is only at this point, after ten years of state legalist propagandizing, that he promulgated the formal end of slavery. A reader of the Naskah will notice a familiar name among the roster of Tuanku Laras—Imam Bondjol’s son, Sutan Caniago, represented Alahan Panjang.

In a separate article, Van Ronkel (1915) summarizes the first two sections of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol, but he fails to acknowledge an intertextual connection between the three sections. When read cohesively, it is clear that the Naskah is a single, polyvalent text. The first section, the narrative of Tuanku Imam Bondjol, is a story of war and defeat. Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s singular triumph is the realization of his misguided decision to join the Padris. He embarks on a campaign of apology and restitution that is largely ignored by both the local traditional elite and the Dutch military. Nor is the Tuanku Imam a martyr. He relents in the Padri War and is defeated in the war against the Dutch, but he is not executed. Instead, his request to remain in his homeland is denied, and he lives a long life as an exile in what might be considered a Protestant beach resort in northern Sulawesi. If people were searching Indonesian history for unrepentant neo-Wahhabis, then they could choose from Haji Miskin, Tuanku nan Renceh, or Tuanku Rao. If they wanted to memorialize non-violent and moderate reformists, then Tuanku nan Tuo or Syekh Jalaluddin are worthy of admiration. Instead, Tuanku Imam Bondjol is remembered—a man who was ultimately a military failure, who was ideologically disillusioned, and for whom a shift from violent action to conciliatory discourse was rewarded with exile and misery. Section two of the Naskah is equally perplexing.

In 1865, in time for the first of the two legal symposia, Naali Sutan Caniago was toiling as an unhappy bureaucrat in the colonial administration. His appointment
as Tuanku Laras seems to have been the result of the Dutch state fulfilling a thirty-
year-old promise to his father (Imam Bondjol 2004, 234). Sutan Caniago’s narrative
is not one of warfare, but, like his father’s, it, too, is one of disappointment and
humiliation. In years of service, Sutan Caniago clashes with corrupt Minangkabau
colleagues and unresponsive Dutch superiors. The narrative concludes with a long
series of dialogues between Sutan Caniago and Dutch officials, including the Tuan
Besar (the resident). During a dressing-down, Sutan Caniago protests, claiming
that he does not proselytize (mendakwa) or even speak but merely wanders the
roadways supervising laborers (Imam Bondjol 2004, 257). He has become a per-
verse inversion of a traditional Tuanku. A religious Tuanku would be localized
and visited by students seeking knowledge. He would speak and not move; his
voice would be the site of his authority. Sutan Caniago is voiceless, moving aim-
lessly, the sort of powerless wanderer who is a tragic figure in Minangkabau litera-
ture (Hadler 1998, 141). He complains of people who mandago mandagi (an odd
expression that suggests insubordination). The Tuan Besar asks him to explain the
term, and Sutan Caniago responds that mandago “is the making of a disturbance in
the country [negeri] that interrupts the livelihood of the people … And mandagi is
the making of disputes that impede the flow of money.” At this point a sympathetic
datuk, a customary leader, attempts to show respect for Sutan Caniago and is re-
primanded by the jaksa, the native law official, in Dutch-inflected Minangkabau:

Do not, now, show respect to Tuanku Sutan in any manner. Why do you
pointlessly oppose the Dutch, and don’t start begging for mercy. Now
it is too late to beg for mercy.

Jangan, nou, disembah jua Tuanku Sutan pakai apa di no tu. Menagapa
awak sio-sio melawan anak Kompeni, jangan minta ampun jua lai. Tidak
boleh kini lagi minta ampun. (Imam Bondjol 2004, 259–60)

Sutan Caniago then requests to speak privately with the resident and the comman-
der. He threatens the state with the wrath of his children and sisters’ children if his
grievances are not addressed, saying to the resident, “I will salute you from your
shoes to the tufts of your hair if you permit me to make my request part of the
written record.” The text then seems to trail off, unresolved: “And so it was
from this day forth I was allowed to remain outside of the [true] custom and
request that the command of [invented colonial] custom and the command of
the corvée bear witness to Lord Allah and Muhammad so concludes this matter
in the year 1868 in the village of Kampung Koto in the house of Tuanku Laras

There is no recorded response to Sutan Caniago’s plea and no narrative resol-
ution in the second section of the Naskah. But, of course, the text itself is the
answer to Sutan Caniago’s request. It is the written record that he demanded.
And the apparently unconnected third section is the response of the colonial
state to his pledge for a life lived outside Minangkabau tradition and under the invented adat of colonial law. He has successfully generated an archive—the second section of the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol. His voice is heard. And while we might suspect that Sutan Caniago would have been removed or quit his post as Tuanku Laras after the confrontation in 1868, we know from the third section of the Naskah that he attended both law meetings in 1865 and 1875. The Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol is the history of the Padri War, but it is also an allegory of the transition from precolonial custom and the possibility of militant Islamic radicalism to a state of discourse and colonial law. This is not merely a matter of Dutch control but a return to an era of weak kingship and consultative adat councils that was remembered as a politically stable period before the Islamic reformism of the later eighteenth century. The Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol appeals to the deliberative idiom of Minangkabau adat, to the traditional “democracy” of the highlands, and to a vision of a local political tradition that was relatively egalitarian and nonviolent. After the turmoil of the Padri Wars, the colonial state might have evoked the discursive power of what Jane Drakard (1999) has called the seventeenth-century “kingdom of words,” a time when textual authority superceded military power and Minangkabau was defined not by military muscle but by the rhetorical prowess of the court.

TROPE

In 1908 West Sumatra was again in rebellion, in response to the shift from the cultivation system to a money tax. But by the 1910s, the Minangkabau highlands had been pacified and trumpeted by the colonial administration as a tourist destination, a tropical Switzerland of meadows, lakes, and waterfalls. Guidebooks promoted the natural beauty of the region but also made a point of describing the sites of the Padri War, battlefields usually marked with grand monuments (Westenenk 1913; see figure 3). Bahder Djohan, a Minangkabau intellectual training to be a medical doctor in Batavia, wrote of these monuments in the journal Jong-Sumatra. Thoughtful travelers, he remarks, will notice the towers dedicated to Michiels and Raaff and will be curious about what events they commemorate.

Cast your gaze to the highlands of the Padang-Darat, red with spilled blood that flowed from the hearts of brothers and sisters. Your ears will hear again the dejected cries of lost souls, scattered in a civil war. You will recall a specific moment, so difficult to forget, when combatants from abroad, equipped with the tools of civilization and struggle, set foot in the highlands where the victory banners of the Padri fluttered in the breeze, and upon the ruins of this mazhab established European control (that has been only occasionally shaken by the rebellions of the local states). Up until today this European control has sunk its roots firmly into the earth. (Djohan 1919)
But if Djohan is critical of the Dutch, he is equally unhappy with the Padris:

At that time too the world witnessed the destruction of the kingdom of Minangkabau, a kingdom that had long shined gloriously in its greatness, a greatness that still radiates in the hearts of the people of Central Sumatra, though at that time the Minangkabau star sank into the ocean of history, and until now is mourned by the people as a lost paradise.

Bahder Djohan was, in the eyes of the colonial state, an ideal subject, a man who represented the fruition of the theory of association, a citizen of the tropical Netherlands. He was fluent in Dutch and his critique of colonialism was nonthreatening and nonviolent, conducted in the salons of the capital and among sensitive native and Dutch intellectuals. His essay on the Padri era cites Dutch sources, and he is poetic when reflecting on the failure of moderate reformism:

We are writing about the beginning of the nineteenth century. The sun had almost set. His vanishing rays gilded the edges of the western sky. In the valley of Agam, in the nagari Koto Tuo, a renowned religious scholar sat up in a prayer house. Tuanku Koto Tuo was observing the sky as it clouded over. What was it that was appearing in his face? What had he felt, that the sun now sinking would bring prosperity and peace to his land? What did he feel, that the gold in the clouds reflected flames that would soon ignite all groups and show them a way of thinking and provide them with direction?

Or was he then contemplating his beloved student, Tuanku Nan Renceh, then teaching in the nagari Kamang? Had he felt that the conduct of his student who he had hoped would plant the seeds of unity/brotherhood among the inhabitants of Minangkabau had gone on to ignite animosity between siblings (sanak saudara) and within families (sekaoem sekeloearga)?

Tuanku Koto Tuo’s tears flowed, and his sobs cut into the stillness of calm of the highlands, that were now covered in a sheet of darkness …

Bahder Djohan goes on to provide a critique of the violence and what he sees as the venomous Wahhabi ideology of the Padri. Haji Miskin and Tuanku nan Renceh are to him traitors and murderers, and unredeemable. But Bahder Djohan concludes,

And unlike those who merely follow their passions, there was one who would inscribe his name in the hearts of the people he loved. So the history [tambo] of Indies wars will never forget the name of Tuanku Imam, an honest and straightforward man, forced to join in sailing his prahu in a sea of tears that were shed by his own people.
Djohan imagines Tuanku Imam Bondjol standing alone on the hill overlooking Bonjol,

Wrapped in his white robe, in his left hand the string of prayer beads, while his great turban shaded a face that was no longer shining, two eyes staring out as far as they could see as though searching for some luck that would never again be found.

The 1910s, when Bahder Djohan was writing, marked the start of the pergerakan, an “age in motion” for Indonesia, a time of radical politics when nationalism was not yet the obvious goal of anticolonial struggle (Shiraishi 1990). Bahder Djohan was part of a small native elite who were receiving a higher education in the capital. He was an intellectual who celebrated science and modernity, an internationalist who nevertheless was a Minangkabau patriot. Bahder Djohan was able to envision a history of Minangkabau in which Tuanku Imam Bondjol was noble and tragic, a person for whom the violence that seemed to come so easily was in fact a defensive reaction of last resort. In West Sumatra, the figure of Imam Bondjol was, in the pergerakan, constructed as the ideological ancestor of the modern political struggle. The trajectory of Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s life—conflicted, tragic, and aleatory—would be a parable for the women and men of the Age in Motion.
In the 1910s and 1920s, colonial West Sumatra was a world turned upside down. For Minangkabau it was not unreasonable to believe that the day of reckoning, foretold in the Qur’an, was imminent. In smaller villages, the conflict between reformist and traditionalist religious leaders had proved divisive; in separate mosques and prayer houses, doomsayers awaited Judgment Day and final arbitration. This religious factionalism was particularly significant for the nagari—the Minangkabau “autonomous village republics” whose ideal composition included a single prayer house. Two decades of social and bureaucratic intervention had transformed the nagari, and in 1914 the Nagari Ordinance formally reorganized local authority. Dutch-sanctioned headmen, panghulu, administered taxes through a new “nagari council.” Its mollifying nod to tradition and restoration fooled nobody (Oki 1977, 82–91). Less visibly, dogmatic disputes began to cleave families. Uncles, nephews, fathers, and sons were set against one another in their allegiance to particular ideological groupings—traditionalist, reformist, and so forth. With both religious authority divided and the traditional leaders corrupted, the sacred pillars of Minangkabau society were teetering precariously. This social uncertainty made the figure of Tuanku Imam Bondjol, whose life was a tale of missteps, reversals, and disillusionment, appealing and familiar.

West Sumatra was unusual in that the most factious debates took place in small villages, many of them with local printing presses. Politics and “modernity” did not originate in the provincial capital. As villages fractured, so, too, were the urban centers caught up in the pergerakan and movements of political and social awakening. In the hill town of Padang Panjang, the famous modernist Thawalib schools became the loci of a form of intellectualized Islamic communism. Disaffected civil servants in Silungkang allied with Ombilin coal mine workers, and in the final hours of 1926, a communist uprising broke out in the nearby industrial town of Sawahlunto (Nasution 1981, 83–91).

The period following the communist Silungkang uprising brought increased Dutch surveillance and repression to West Sumatra. The dynamic years of movement and intellectual strife were coming to an end in the Minangkabau highlands, as they were in the rest of the Indies. In 1930 the ulama were united one last time, in successful opposition to the colonial “Guru Ordinance.” This was a revision of a law that had been in place in Java and Madura since 1905, requiring any would-be Islamic teacher to obtain permission from a district chief before speaking publicly (Abdullah 1971, 110–13). And in fact, there was a final flare of political activity in Minangkabau in the early 1930s. New parties...
launched aggressive campaigns of rallies and demonstrations; in the face of increased nationalist awareness, local politics promoted Minangkabauess, tjap Minangkabau. But in 1933, travel restrictions within Minangkabau began to be strictly enforced. A network of police informants created suspicion and undermined morale within the increasingly circumscribed movement of the pergerakan. And following their century-old and successful policy, the Dutch boosted the power of local adat authorities as a self-suppressing element in Minangkabau society (Abdullah 1971, 176–205; Kahin 1984). In August, 1933, the colonial government arrested many of the Minangkabau activists, snuffing out the last spark of the movement in Minangkabau. As Taufik Abdullah writes,

The extensive politicization of Minangkabau made it one of the most dangerous regions in the eyes of the government. The government vigorously applied the repressive measures which characterized the policy of rust en orde [peace and security]. Minangkabau became the test case for the government’s hard-line policies. “From the West Coast (of Sumatra),” according to a famous colonial theoretician, de Kat Angelino, “the victory begins.” (1971, 195)

It was the Silungkang uprising that had signaled the end of overt Minangkabau politics, however. Following the uprisings, the pergerakan movements, channeled through the prison camp Boven Digul and nationalist youth oath “Sumpah Pemuda,” became focused upon a future Indonesia. The schools and movements had undergone transformations, preparing them for a shift to nationalism. During the 1920s, the Thawalib and Islamic schools in Padang Panjang and Bukittinggi had become self-funding, raising money through the sale of books published by Syekh Muhammad Djamin Djambek’s press, Tsamaratul Ichwan, and utilizing established networks of Minangkabau batik traders for sales and distribution throughout the Indies (Noer 1973, 35–37; Daya 1995, 245–300). Soetan Mangkoeto, a graduate of these reformist schools, promised to donate 10 percent of the proceeds of his book to help build schools in Padang Panjang. This book, Preachers’ Torch of Indonesian Islam, was an attack on the Guru Ordinance. By the late 1920s, we can already read the dominance of “Indonesia,” of the Sumpah Pemuda and nationalism, in local writings:

The children of Indonesia who desert or neglect Islam, no matter how much they might shout about saving their nation and homeland (Greater Indonesia), they will never attain it. (Mangkoeto 1929, 43)17

17“Anak Indonesia jang meninggalkan atau melengahkan agama Islam, biar bagaimana djoega dianja berteriak akan mentjari keselamatan bangsa dan tanah air [Indonesia raja] tentoe tidak akan tertjapai.”
And the heyday of the movements of the Minangkabau _pergerakan_, the first two decades of the twentieth century, a time of manifold voices and visions, would never return.

With political oppression came restrictions on publishing and widespread censorship (Yamamoto 1995; Maters 1998). It was in the aftermath of the crackdown that the former activists redirected their energy into publications that would not raise eyebrows in the Office for Native Affairs. This publishing industry was centered in West Sumatra, in Padang and Bukittinggi, and in Medan in North Sumatra. The majority of the writers were Minangkabau or Mandailing (the Batak society that was the target of Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s northern campaign). The books produced were inexpensive magazines called _roman pitjisan_, penny dreadfuls, and were printed for subscribers in large print runs (three thousand copies was usual) that were always sold out. These booklets found their way into the many lending libraries scattered across the archipelago. Compared to most contemporary publications, their readership was extremely broad (Oshikawa 1990; Siegel 1997; Maier 2004).

Only a very limited number of the _roman pitjisan_ survive in the archive. Despite the large number printed, they were not considered to be serious literature and worthy of a place in permanent collections. They were printed on cheap paper, and a single copy was often circulated among a large group of readers. Surviving texts are always brittle and disintegrating. However, a persistent search of the libraries in Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United States has uncovered a few hundred extant _roman pitjisan_, and of these, there are eight texts from the 1930s and 1940s that feature Tuanku Imam Bondjol (Sou’ib 1938; Dihoeloe 1939; Darmansjah 1940; Umri 1940; Turie 1941; Sou’yb 1948–49). All texts portray the Tuanku Imam as a noble and tragic figure, and all freely blend known history and fiction. Like most _roman pitjisan_, there is a very thinly veiled anticolonial subtext in these stories. Dihoeloe’s book, _The Story and Struggle of Tuanku Imam Bondjol as a Hero of Islam: Compiled from the Notes of His Son the Late Sutan Caniago_, tries to hew most closely to historical narrative conventions. Yet in this text, the critical moment, the gathering of the traditional elite and ulama in which Tuanku Imam Bondjol renounces Wahhabism and attempts to reconcile Islam and Minangkabau custom, is here described in Dutch buzzwords as a _Propaganda-Vergadering_, a “propaganda meeting” (Dihoeloe 1939, 12). For these authors, Tuanku Imam Bondjol is clearly established as an ancestral allegory of defeated anticolonial resistance, one whose fate their friends, exiled to the prison camp at Boven Digoel, now shared.

The _roman pitjisan_ are delights for literary historians. The language in them is experimental and incisive and the politics obnoxious. But they represent a tragic turn in Indonesian intellectual history. The 1930s repression forced the fictionalization of historical discourse, and this textual movement was spearheaded by writers from West Sumatra. The novelists who created the _roman pitjisan_ lived in a time when secular novelistic and religious lives were not exclusive. Authors
such as Hamka and Jusuf Sou’yb had careers that saw adat and Islam decompartmentalized. They were free to write novels or religious tracts, but they could not produce direct political discourse without the promise of censorship and threat of exile. This inability to address political and historical issues unambiguously led to a stagnation of historiographical analysis in West Sumatra that lasted through the Japanese occupation, the revolution, and into the national period. The postrevolutionary 1950s, a dynamic time in Indonesian political life, brought little historical introspection to West Sumatra (Asnan 2004). In the late 1950s, in response to the victory of Sukarno’s secular nationalists and communists in the 1955 elections, West Sumatra erupted in what has been called a “half-hearted rebellion.” Minangkabaus had no stomach for waging war against a central state that they had recently fought to create, and Indonesian forces smashed the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) with relative ease (Feith and Lev 1969; Kahin and Kahin 1995).

By the middle of 1961, Minangkabau patriotism was ruined. The PRRI revolutionary government secessionists, whose three-year struggle against the national state had been a protest against the central government’s perceived Javanism and communism, were beaten. Minangkaban people left West Sumatra for Jakarta and Medan, never to return. This was a time of rantau cino, permanent “Chinese” out-migration, when Minangkabau gave their children Javanese names and grumbled that at home in Sumatra, “the winners (yang Minang) have all left, what remains are the water buffalo (Ka[r]bau).” Jakarta’s Padang restaurants boomed and migrants from Sumatra, ethnicity withheld, fitted themselves into lives far from ancestral highlands and unhappy memories.

The year 1963 brought another slap to the exhausted Minangkabauists. In his wonderfully bizarre “Tuanku Rao: Hambali Islamic Terror in the Batak Lands (1816–1833),” the Mandailing writer Mangaradja Onggang Parlindungan scoffs, 

The Brothers from Minang are severely handicapped due to their belief in ahistorical myths. The myth of Alexander the Great’s dynasty, the myth of the Victorious Buffalo, the myth of the ur-Mother, the Legend of Minangkabau and the like have been swallowed whole by the Brothers from Minang. They have been incapable of selecting-out the 2% historical facts and kicking-out the 98% mythologic ornamentations within those myths. They have not made the slightest effort to seek out accurate dates and put an end to the big confusions.

Brothers from Minang sangat parah handicapped, karena kepertjajaan mereka akan mythos2 tanpa angka2 tahunan. Mythos Iskandar Zulkarnain Dynasty, Mythos Menang Kerbau, Mythos Bundo Kanduang, Tambo Minangkabau, dlsb., semuanya 100% ditelan oleh Brothers from Minang. Tanpa mereka sanggup selecting-out 2% facta2 sejarah dan kicking-out 98% mythologic ornamentations dari mythos2 itu.
The book presented a bitter history of the Padri War and the conversion of the Mandailing Batak to Islam. Parlindungan, a Muslim Mandailing himself, recapitulated the violence of Tuanku Imam Bondjol from the perspective of the targets of his northern jihad. It took the fall of Sukarno and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party for the brothers from Minangkabau to answer Parlindungan’s challenge. The first “History of Minangkabau” was published in 1970 and included a self-congratulatory foreword by Parlindungan himself (Mansoer et al., 1970). With corroborated dates and a substantial bibliography, the authors synthesized the ethnomythical history of Minangkabau and the political history of West Sumatra. The great Islamic populist intellectual, Hamka, directly challenged Parlindungan in his 1974 book *Tuanku Rao* between Fact and Fantasy (Hamka 1974). Hamka had read the book while in prison during Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, and in the early 1970s engaged in a polemic with Parlindungan in the newspaper *Haluan* (Padang). It was this debate that finally allowed Minangkabau historians to shake off the legacy of the *roman pitjisan* and begin to unpack history from fiction.

The trope of Tuanku Imam Bondjol, first challenged by Parlindungan, was again questioned during the Soeharto regime. In 1980 Wisran Hadi’s play *Imam Bondjol* was staged at the Dewan Kesenian Jakarta (Hadi 2002). The play is not reverential, and it challenges the popular image of Imam Bondjol. He is depicted as a bumbler and a man uncomfortable with his role as religious leader, rejecting the title Tuanku Imam and asserting that “my name is Peto Syarif!” The play was controversial and stimulated debate in 1980 but was not censored. However, in 1995 Wisran Hadi prepared to stage the play again as part of the West Sumatran celebration of the second Istiqlal Festival and the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesian independence. The governor of West Sumatra wrote to the central government in Jakarta requesting that the production be cancelled for fear of inciting unrest. The performance was blocked and the play was effectively banned (Sahrul 2005). The New Order government of Soeharto, itself an echo of the Dutch police state of the 1930s, was invested in the stifling of historiographical discourse (Anderson 1983). Soeharto’s own state mythology was a skein of historical lies that could not afford to have even a provincial performance tugging on its threads.

While the trope of Bondjol as a figure of Minangkabau heroic defeat was pervasive, Tuanku Imam Bondjol occasionally appeared in his revolutionary and potentially violent guise. In the early 1930s, young nationalists hung a portrait of the Tuanku Imam on the door of the Indonesian Club in Weltevreden, a “victim of the movement [pergerakan], a victim of the changing times and a victim of his own ideals” (N. 1931). The most profound rhetorical use of Imam Bondjol was subtle and can be found in the philosophical writings of the
great Indonesian communist Tan Malaka, himself a Minangkabau from a village not far from Bonjol. Imprisoned from 1942 to 1943, he composed Madillog: Materialisme, Dialektika, Logika, completing the manuscript in 1946. At the end of the book, he describes a future polity that he calls the socialist Federasi-Aslia, “Its location is traced by an axis, near the equator, that is more or less determined by a line from Bonjol to Malaka” (Malaka 1951, 395).18 Rudolf Mrázek notes that Tan Malaka’s use of the village of Bonjol reflects his Minangkabauist outlook and is meant to be a tribute to the Tuanku’s struggle against the Dutch (1972, 34). However, the word sumbu, or “axis,” can also be translated as “fuse,” suggesting explosive movement. Along with the geographic tribute, Tan Malaka intended to describe an explosive and revolutionary fuse running through history from Tuanku Imam Bondjol to himself.

Today there is a renaissance of publishing in West Sumatra and a reinvigorated drive to historiographical debate. In 2004 the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bondjol was published in Padang, and Wisran Hadi’s play was filmed for television. Both texts complicate the role of the Tuanku Imam as a national hero. In a 2004 interview with representatives of the International Crisis Group, a leading Salafi Muslim in Jakarta held forth on the the history of the Padri War, acknowledging Haji Miskin and Imam Bondjol as the progenitors of Salafism in Indonesia.19 It remains to be seen in the post-Soeharto period how Indonesians will read the history of Tuanku Imam Bondjol.20 It is clear, however, that, banknotes aside, he is being unyoked from conventional nationalist historiography, his ambiguity restored.

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18“Letaknja adalah segaris dengan sumbu, dekat Chatulistiwa, jang kira-kira ditentukan oleh garis Bondjol-Malaka.”
19Personal communication with Sidney Jones, May 15, 2005.
20In 2007, two important books reopened the debate about the Padri War and Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s place in Indonesian history. Parlindungan’s Tuanku Rao was reissued by LKiS Yogyakarta in a facsimile edition. And the Mandailing activist Basyral Hamidy Harahap, reflecting on Parlindungan, challenged the nationalist historiography on the Padri War in his book Greget Tuanku Rao. There have been anti-Padri screeds and rebuttals in the national press and an apparently ineffectual campaign to have Tuanku Imam Bondjol’s status as a national hero revoked. As this article was submitted to JAS in 2006, I am unable to address substantively these new polemics.
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